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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
CHEVRON OIL COMP ANY, doing business
as STANDARD OIL COMP ANY OF
CALIFORNIA,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

vs.
BEA VER COUNTY, a legislative corporation
of the State of Utah, et al.,

Case No.
11,317

Defendants and Respondents.

PHILLIPS PETROLEUM COMP ANY, a
Delaware corporation, et al.,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,

vs.
BEA VER COUNTY, a legislative corporation
of the State of Utah, et al.,

Case No.
11,318

Defendants and Respondents.

PETITION FOR REHEARING
Appellants petition the Court to vacate its decision
[lncl grant a rehearing. The motion is based on the following grounds:
1. 'l1 he Court erred in holding that the zoning re-

striction, which admittedly prevents any economic use
rif tlw plaintiffs' property, does not violate the Constitutions of Utah or the United States. The Court overlooked
tli<> nncontrm-erted fact that the character of the prop-
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erty was radically changed by the constrnction of the
freeway and the interchange at Pine Creek Hill. This
interchange converted the property from grazing land
into highway service property.
2. The Court erred in holding that the restriction
of appellants' property to grazing purposes promotes
the public welfare. The uncontradicted evidence establishes that the restriction is affirmatively detrimental to
the public welfare.
3. The Court erred in deciding that the plaintiffR'
proposed operations at Pinr Creek Hill would deprive
existing establishments in the 'l'own of Beaver of the
freeway-generated business. The physical facts are that
these existing establishments are a half mile or more
away from the freeway and traffic must leave the freeway and detour to reach them. It is a matter of common
knowledge and the evidence is clear that the great bulk
of freeway traffic will not make this detour and will
not reach the established outlets in the Town of Beaver.
4. The Court erred in holding that the decision of
the zoning authority that the restriction of the plain·
tiffs' property to grazing use promotes the public welfare, is conclusive. Whether the restriction promotes the
public welfare is a question of law for the Court to
decide.
5. The Court erred in holding that plaintiffs are
in effect estopped to question the constitutionality of the
ordinance because they acquired the property after the
ordinance was passed. The fallacy in this decision is that
the freeway converted the property in question from
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grazing land into highway service land. The interchange
at Pine Creek Hill was designed and established for
the V(>ry purpose of making the property now owned by
the plaintiffs a location where freeway motorists could
obtain needed supplies and services without leaving the
freeway.
G. The statement in the decision that the plaintiffs
acquired the property in the hope of converting it into
highway service property is wholly unwarranted and
incorrect. The property had been converted into high\\ ay service property long before any of the plaintiffs
arqnired any interest in it.
7. 'l'he Court's comment that plaintiffs purchased
tht> property for a nominal snm with the intention of
disposing of it at a handsome profit is likewise without
nny foundation in the record or in fact. The fact is
that the plaintiffs paid the full value of the property
for highway service purposes and never had any intention of using it for any other purpose.
8. The Court has failed to give any effoot to Rule
fi'.: and its decision is in conflict with its prior decisions.

ARGUMENT
'i'he Court holds that a zoning restriction upon the
ll:se of the property if valid when encated remains valid
tlwreafter and immune from any constitutional attack
llotwithstanding a radical change in the character of
tlw l1rop0rty has taken place since the ordinance was
adoptPd. We submit that the Court erred and we urgently
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request that the proposition be reconsidered and rejected.
It is contrary to law, as declared by every appellate
court that has considered it.
The correct principle is applied in Ford vs. The
City of Miami Beach, 1 So.2d 642, where the facts were
exactly analogous to those in the case at bar. The property involved in the cited case consisted of vacant lot~
abutting on the ocean and having a depth of approximately 270 feet at the time the zoning ordinance was
adopted. The lots were properly zoned residential. Some
years later the back part of the lots was washed away
by natural forces, reducing the lots to the depth of 60
or 70 feet, rendering them unsuited to residential purposes. The plaintiffs purchased the lots after the change
had occurred and while the lots were still zoned residential. They applied to the City to have the property rezoned to permit the construction and operation of a
hotel. The City refused to amend the ordinance and the
plaintiff brought suit to have it adjudged to be unconstitutional and invalid. The trial court upheld the action
of the City, refusing to am(~nd the ordinance. '1 he plaintiffs appealed and the Supreme Court of Florida reversed the judgment of the trial court. It held that th~
restriction of the lots to residential purposes confiscatrd
the property in violation of the Constitution. The opinion stated:
1

"Restrictions on private property must he kept
within the limifa of necessity for the pnhlic wel
fare or it will be recognized as an unlawful taking.
Averne Bay Constr. Co. v. Thatcher, 278 N.Y. 22~.
15 N.E.2d 587, 117 A.L.R. 1110. And when vroperty, restricted to a dt>fined nse by a zoning ordi-

nance, changes its physical character from natural
causes to the extent that it is no longer adaptable
to the use it is zoned for, then it becomes the
duty of the zoning board to relax its restrictions
to prevent confiscation just as much so as in the
case where the regulation was invalid in the first
instance. See State ex rel. Tavlor v. Jacksonville
.
'
supra; Ex parte Wise, 141 Fla. 222, 192 So. 872."

1.

The correct proposition is thus declared in Stevens
Toirn of Huntington, 229 N.E.2d 591, as follows:
"Situated as the property is, adjacent to a large
shopping area, it can hardly be said that the land
is reasonably adapted to residential use. This
does not mean, of course, that it is impossible to
use the property as a residence. It has, in fact,
been so used since 1950. But, in the intervening
years, the character of the surrounding area has
changed so radically that it is unreasonable to
dE~mand that the property be continued for use as
a residence onlv. The burdens of traffic on Route
110, the noise, ~nd the stores in the area, all contribute to making the property unsuitable for
residential use - a fact amply established by the
evidence."

'rlw lt·ading case on this point is Arverne Bay
Constr. Co. v. Thatcher, 278 N.Y. 222, 15 N.E.2d 587, 117
A.L.R. 1110, cited in our opening brief. This is an exceptionally well reasoned decision by a very able Court.
It has hem followed and approved by practically every
appr•llate. court and, insofar as we can determine, has
never be0n critieizPd. An examination of the cases cited
in Nlu·pherd's Citation will disclose that this decision is
a landmark in zoning law. It is squarely in point, and
\\ (' nro·p
its careful consideration.
b

.
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This Court's decision that the plaintiffs are not de.
prived of their property because tlH'Y bought grazing
land and still own grazing land is unrealistic and unwar.
ranted. That the restriction of the plaintiffs' property
to grazing purposes prevents them from making any
economic or beneficial nse of the property is conclusively
established. At no stage of this proceeding have thr,
defendants or any of them denied this fact. If preventing
a property owner from making any beneficial use of his
property does not deprive him of that property, it is
difficult to conceive of anything that would effe0t such
a result. ·what value does property have if it cannot
be put to any beneficial use 1 According to this Court,
plaintiffs are not deprived of their property because they
are still permitted to pay taxes on it. Such a conclusion
finds not support in reason or in law.
It is a misconception of the situation to say that
the plaintiffs purchased grazing land and that they still
own grazing land. What the plaintiffs purchased and
what they now own is highway service property, a very
valuable commercial site. The restriction completely destroys this value and it clearly deprives the plaintiffs of
their property without due process of law.

Suppose that the livestock man who owned the property originally had brought suit to have the ordinance
declared invalid upon the same ground that plaintiffs
rely on. Would any court uphold the zoning restriction
in face of the fact that the character of the property
has been completely changed by the freeway interchange!
The answer is obvious. The plaintiffs have, of course,
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succeeded to all of their grantor's rights in the property
and that includes the rights guaranteed by the Constitution.
1'he charge made by this Court that the plaintiffs
imrchased the property for a nominal sum with the idea
of realizing a handsome profit is completely unwarranted
aHd incorrect. This is not a fact and nothing in the
record sustains it. It was orally stipulated at the pretrial that Chevron Oil Company paid $50,000 for its
parcel, which is many times its value as grazing land.
'l'he implication drawn by the Court that the plaintiffs
are s11eculators and should be in effect estopped from
rlaiming that the ordinance confiscates the property is
without any basis in fact or in law.
ln Forbes vs. Hubbard, 180 N.E. 767, a similar
charge was made.
"Counsel for appellants argue that this suit is but
an attempt on the part of appellee to destroy the
zoning ordinance of the village for his personal
benefit; that he purchased the property after the
zoning ordinance was passed, and is gambling on
the possibility of making a large profit on it if the
zoning ordinance can be destroyed. The evidence
shows that appellee paid $350 per front foot for
this property, which is seven times the highest
value placed on the lot as residence property."

• • • •

"Whether appellee loses or gains by the outcome
of this lawsuit is a matter about which we can
have no concern. No moral turpitude, as seems
to be urged by counsel for appellants, is perceived,
however, in appellee's taking upon himse~f, by
his purchase and suit, the burden and clann of
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r:moving :vhat he alleges to be an illegal restric.
hon. Motives of self-interest are most conunon
in lawsuits, but snch motives have never been, and
cannot be held to be a sufficient reason for with.
holding relief to which parties show themselw~
entitled. It is conceded that the invasion of ap1wJ.
lee's property is serious and highly injurious. Ir
such invasion bears a substantial relation to the
public good, he must, as this court has many times
said, bear the burden. lf, however, that restriction lacks the necessary basis of public good it
comes within the constitutional inhibition against
taking private property for the public use without
compensation.

"(3, 4) Counsel for appdlants argue that as av·
pellee purchased this property after the passage
of the zoning ordinance he should not now be
heard to complain that that ordinance is invalid.
We know of no rule of law that creates an estoppel
against attack by such purchaser on the validity
of a zoning ordinance nnless there bl' in his acts
or the acts of his grantor that which of themselves would estop him."
In Trust Company vs. City of Chicago, 96 N.E.2d
499, the Court said :
"This does not mean, however, that a purchaser
of property upon which a restriction had previously been imposed by a zoning ordinance may not
attack the validity of such restriction. Forbes '"
Hubbard, 348, Ill.' 166, 180 N.E. 767. Neither su~h
purchase nor the fact that the purchase~· .or !11S
grantor may have acquiesced in such classif1c~ti.on
will estop the purchaser from testing the validity
of the ordinance, since this court is committed_ to
the doctrine that mere acquiescence, irrespcctivP
of the length thereof, cannot legalize the e!Par
usurpation of power which off ends against the
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basic law. Harmon v. City of Peoria, 373 Ill. 594,
27 N.E.2d 525; Forbes v. Hubbard, 348 Ill. 16G,
18? ~.E. 767. Zoning ordinances, whether they be
origmal or amendatory legislation, and regardless of how long or by whom they have been
recognized as legal, cannot be sustain~d if in violation of the constitution."
'['he argmnent that plaintiffs are not deprived of
their proverty he<'anse tlH'Y purchased it after the ordi1ia11ee was adopted a11d can still use it for grazing purpo:-:Ps is entirel)' spPcious. In a yery real sense, the
n•striction is a continuing, unla\vful burden which follows the property nntil it is removed. Suppose the
County had unlawfully constructed a wall around the
i;t·orwrty which i)revented any access to it except for
goats. \Vould the Court say that the owner of the propPrty could not assert that he had been deprived of his
property because he purchased it after the wall was built
and could still use it for grazing purposes~ To answer
tlwse qtwstions in the affirmative would mean that coniotitntional guaranties are operative only at intervals and
dependPnt npon the time when the owner acquires his
title. No authority can be found for such an interpretation of the Constitution.
'l'his Court's reliance upon Dowse vs. Salt Lake City
is misplaced. Each zoning case must rest upon its own
facts and snnounding circumstances. This is so because
the validity of the ordinance depends upon the character
of the property involved and the impact of the ordinance
lllJOn thP public welfare. The facts and circumstances in
tlw Dow::;e case are so radically different from those in
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the case at bar that it cannot be regarded as persuasive
authority.
The right to acquire and use propert)' for a lawful
purpose is an inherent right and existed prior to any
constitutional enactment. The latter merely guaranteE>s
the integrity of the right. It is not within the power of
the state or any subdivision thereof to deprive an owner
of all beneficial use of his property without just compensation, regardless of the public welfare or m•ed.

THE RES'rRICTTON ON PLAINTIFFS' PROPERTY
DOES NOT PRO:MOTE THE PUBLIC WELFARE
The Court's conclusion that the restriction against
the plaintiffs' property is detrimental to the public welfare because it would intercept business which would
otherwise go to established enterprises in the Town of
Beaver, thus putting the latter ont of business, is without support in the record. The evidence is overwhelming
that interstate freeway traffic cannot he lured or forced
into the citiPs or towns to obtain the necessary supplies
and services. All of the established businesses in the Town
of Beaver are located a half mile away from the freeway,
and the onlv freeway traffic which will reach them after
the freeway is opened is the traffic which is destined to
the Town. The only hope of protecting the established
businesses in the 'rown of Btiaver after the freeway is
opened lies in inducing new <>ntt·rprises to locate in the
'L'O\Yll.
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No one can deny the need of some commercial dew lopmen t in Beaver County. The plaintiffs' proposed
11roject will not only capture freeway-oriented business
bnt it will provide employment for several families, most
of whom ·will reside in the Town of Beaver. The tax base
will be definitely increased. These various substantial
benPfits will be available without any appreciable cost
whatever to the County. The claim that the County will
he required to furnish fire protection and police protection is purely fanciful. The County has no fire equiprnent and there is no water in the vicinity of Pine Creek
Hill which could be used to extinguish fires. The plaintiffs will be required to furnish all utilities and fire
protection. If at any time school children need to be
tram;ported, the State and not the County will bear the
rxpense. The suggestion that the burdens of governrnen outweigh the benefits to be derived from the developrnnt at Pine Creek Hill is a pure fiction.
It is error to ignore the rights of the freeway traveler
to obtain his services and supplies without leaving the
free~way. It is likewise error to ignore the safety and
convenience of these travelers, which is definitely involved if adequate freeway-oriented services and supplips are not available. When the uncontradicted evidence and the physical facts and surrounding circum::>tances are considered, the question whether the restriction promotes the public welfare is one of law and is
not open to honest debate of the facts. The Zoning Commist:>ion and the Board of County Commissioners determined that the public welfare required that property
along the freeway located several miles from established
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commnniti<>s should h<' allocat<>d to highway servi('e
zones. Such an allocation was a necPssar:> and important
llart of tlw zoning plan and was a determination that
public welfare demanded it. By classifying the property
as grazing property, the Board nullified the zoning plan
which it adopkd.
At tlw oral argument, respondents reliPd upon the
opinion of their alleged planning expert to support the
contention that tht• question whether the restriction upon
the use of the plaintiffs' pro1wrty is necessary to promote the public welfare is honestly (lebatable. However,
the law is well settk•d that tlw question whether a restric,
tion upon property promotes the pnblic welfare is a
mixed question of law and fact and if the physical facts
and surrounding circumstances demonstrate that the restriction \\·ill not produc~· any public benefits, it is unreasonahh• and arhitrary, notwithstanding expert opinion
to tlw contrar>·· In the case of Tulsa vs. 81.wnson, 3GG
1'.2d G29, the proposition is clearly stated as follows:
"Bv unmistakahle tPnor of the argmrwnt we are
urg;cd by the cit>· to, in pffect, place its kgislatiw
powers beyond the scope of judicial l'P\-it•w \Yhenever the matter appears 'fairly <lebatahlc.' But
this, as was stated in tlH' Barclay case, must drpend npon the physical facts disclosed in each
particular cast'. \Ve must lw evPr mindful that,
inasmuch as tlw inPvitahlP pff pct of ordinances,
such as the on<> hen· involvPCl, is to limit private
ri<rhts in the inten•::-;t of imhlic welfare, the exNci~P of the municipal powN mnst lw earefnlly
guardPd and be pl:'nnith·d only wh(•n thP cond1tio11s and eircumstai1cct-: as shuwn diselose a need
for the proper cxereist' of thP polieP powN: Ok!ahorna City v. Barclay, snpra. An a(~adPllliC op1n-
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ion of a professional city planner as to the desirability of a particular restriction to serve as a
'buffer of lessPr than normal commercial intensity,' will not, when contradicted by controlling
physical facts, ,jnstif\ this court in holding as a
matter of law that the question here presented is
'fairly debatable' and precludes judicial interference with the municipal determination of necessity for the particnlar restriction placed."
'To the sarnP eff Pct are the following authorities:
Hamer 1·s. Thr Town of Ross, 382 P.2d 375; Davis vs.
City of Hockford, 208 N.E.2d 110; lV olfe vs. Village of
Hirl'rsid<', 208 N.E.2d 833.
the defendants' expert planner who designed
tlH' lH'PSPnt ordinance did not express an unqualified
o]linion on tlH~ public necessity for restricting the use
of the- plaintiffs' pro1wrty. His testimony was that there
was no }ll'esent need for highway service facilities at
I'im· Creek Hill and that the established facilities in the
Town of Beaver could adt>quately supply the needs of
thP frt>eway traffic. Obviously, he had in mind present
conditions and circumstances, particularly that the freeway was not then opt>n and did not by-pass the Town
of Beaver. He further testified that he inserted the
higfovay servicP zone in the ordinance because he foresaw the time when it would be necessary to allocate property abutting the freeway to the highway service zone
in order to meet the public demand. In other words, he
regarded the classification of the plaintiffs' property
as grazing to be temporary classification and that when
tlw freeway was 01wned and the Town of Beaver byriassed, there would be a need to reclassify the property
ill the highway service zone.
Evt~n
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Even if the clef enclants' expert had expressed the
unqualified opinion that the restriction was necessary to
promote the public welfan', such an opinion is completely
discounted by the physical facts and surrounding circmnstances which demonstrate beyond any honest debate that the restriction upon the use of plaintiffs'
property does not produce any public benefit of any
kind or character, but on the contrary, blockades the
much needed commercial development of the County and
deprives the County of an expense-free tax base increase
and the public generally of a much needed freeway-oriented service. The clear fact is that this restriction bt>nefits no onP hut does positive ham1 to a g;reat man~v people.

THE JUDGMENT APPEALED FROM JS NOT
SUPPORTED BY ANY FINDINGS OF FACT
AND SHOULD BE YACATED AND SET ASIDE
The opinion states that this is an <>qnitabl0 vrocPeding and that thP Comi ma:-· review the findings of fact,
bnt should not disturb them unkss they are clearly
against tlw weight of the Pvidence. The opinion is in
error in treating the decision of the trial court as containing any findings of fact. The determinations made
in the trial court's decision are pure conclusions of law.
No findings of fact wen~ ev0r made and none of the
iss11Ps other than issues of law were ever determined.
Rule 52 of the Rules of Civil Procedure is a peremptory command to every trial court to find the facts
specially and state Heparately its conclusion of law in
<'Ven· case wlH'r0 tlwre is no jury. It is only by obeying
this .command that this Court can dt>tPrrninP what the
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lower court actually decided and whether the judicial
mind ever resolved the actual controversy existing behn~en the parties.
The decision of this Court repeals Rule 52 of the
Rnles of Civil Procedure and overrules at least two
prior decisions of this Court which decide that parties
are entitled to a decision of their controversies, rather
tlian a summary brush-off as was done by the trial
court in this case.
CONCLUSION
We respectfully submit that the opinion rendered in
this case is based upon a misconception of the facts
and circumstances surrounding the enactment of the ordinance restricting the use of the property involved; that
the character of the property has been radically changed
h? the construction of the interchange and the Interstate
I1'reeway, so that the restriction confiscates the property
liy preventing any beneficial use thereof, in violation of
the Constitution; that even if the restriction was valid
when enacted, it has since become invalid and it was the
duty of the Board of County Commissioners to rezone
the property and their refusal to do so is arbitrary,
unreasonable and discriminatory; that as a matter of
law, the restriction produces no public welfare.
The decision of this Court that the question of
whether the restriction promotes the public welfare is
honestly debatable, is based upon the erroneous assumption that the freeway-oriented business which would be
intercepted at Pine Creek Hill by plaintiffs' proposed
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operations would find its \my to tlw cstahlishPd husinrs'
enterprises in the Town of Brnwr.
Then• is little doubt but that the establishPd businesses in the Town of BPaYCr will suffer suhstantially
when the frePway is opened and hy-passPs the 'rown of
Bea\·er. This business depression will occur, n•gardlPs8
of wlwther plaintiffs' property at Pim• Cn·Pk Hill is <leveloped as lffOposed by tlH' Tllaintiff s or wlwther it is
allowed to remain idle.
The }Jr<'Sent d('Cision will have far-reaching effrcts
upon tlw economy of Bt•aver County and the safety and
convenience of a large sector of the traveling public. We
nrgPntly request that it he \·acated and the important
questions involwd reconsidered and a decision rendered
in accordance with the facts and thP law.
Rt•spPctfnll~-
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